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INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
AND THE PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF
ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORM
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN*
Policies to control corruption will always be controversial and
contested. Those subject to increased surveillance or limits on their
discretion will bewail the lack of trust these constraints imply.
They will complain that the new controls are politically motivated
and that they fail to respect cultural norms. These objections will
be particularly evident when anti-corruption measures are
imposed or supported by international actors—most notably aid
and lending bodies, global non-profits, or international treaty
regimes. The role of international institutions is necessarily
limited, given the dominant position of nation-states.
Nevertheless, well-executed efforts can benefit ordinary people
and may help, rather than harm, domestic and global businesses.
The losers are those who benefited from corrupt transactions both
in government and in the private sector.
International institutions began to promote an anti-corruption
agenda in the mid-nineties. The end of the Cold War facilitated
these initiatives. For a time, these institutions and their powerful
backers in wealthy countries faced no significant opposition.
Corrupt government leaders in developing countries could no
longer play off the Communist and anti-Communist blocs against
* Henry R. Luce Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University. This
essay is based on the background papers and the discussion at a workshop held at
the Rockefeller Foundation Center in Bellagio, Italy, June 13–17, 2011. Paul
Carrington and I organized the workshop with the financial support of the
Rockefeller Foundation, the Open Society Institute, Yale Law School, and Duke
Law School. We are very grateful for their support. The participants are listed in
the appendix, but none of them is responsible for this essay’s contents except
insofar as I cite their own research. Participants prepared background papers,
most of which will be published in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY: CAN INTERNATIONAL
ACTORS PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE? (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Paul Carrington
eds., forthcoming 2013). A closely related essay will be published as the
introductory chapter in that volume. I wish to thank Laurence Cockcroft, Kevin
Davis, Abiola Makinwa, Olaf Meyer, Tina Søreide, and Liam Wren-Lewis for
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
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one another. The bargaining power of domestic anti-corruption
advocates increased.
But recently, the rise of global investment from China and
other middle-income countries, which were not part of the initial
anti-corruption consensus, has given some political leaders
leverage to resist reform, especially if the host state is resource rich.
I do not mean to suggest that the leaders of emerging middleincome countries actively encourage their investors’ corruption or
benefit from it personally. In fact, they may also be trying to limit
its impact.
Nevertheless, the growing importance of
multinationals from countries outside the 1990s “anti-corruption
consensus” poses a challenge. On the positive side, these firms
increase competition in global markets, but on the negative side,
their use of corrupt tactics increases the pressure on all firms to
follow suit.
My inquiry begins with the fundamental political/economic
problems facing modern states, and it then asks how corruption
can exacerbate these problems. With that background, I consider
feasible options for international bodies operating under severe
political and financial constraints. Here are the key questions:
What is the particular problem of most concern? Is it
stagnating or uneven economic growth in low-income countries or
regions? Is it persistently high levels of poverty and low levels of
human development? Is it the lack of a competitive international
environment for international trade and investment?
Is it
disillusionment with the state—its electoral institutions, the
bureaucracy, or the judiciary—fueled by the belief that
government officials are unconcerned with ordinary citizens’ rights
and interests?
What special problems arise in new democracies with fragile
and untested institutions or in ones where the military is the only
well-organized institution?
Are post-conflict environments
especially vulnerable, or do they provide opportunities for
breaking with a dysfunctional past?
How does corruption in its various forms affect each of these
issues? A satisfactory approach must disaggregate the concept of
“corruption” and measure the impact of each component on the
particular problem of interest. Thus, one could focus either on
bribery and extortion in the day-to-day interactions between
citizens, domestic firms, and state officials or on high-level
malfeasance involving top officials (e.g., politicians, top
bureaucrats, military brass) and large firms—often multi-nationals
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seeking contracts or concessions. Should reformers extend their
reach beyond outright bribery and extortion to consider the
different legal routes through which private wealth, both domestic
and foreign, influences public actors?
Given the conceptual and empirical connections between
corruption and policy outcomes, what anti-corruption policies
might succeed in advancing these goals? Limiting corruption is a
means to an end. The ends of most interest to reformers should
determine which policies deserve emphasis. As John Dugard
argues, freedom from corruption ought not to be classified as a
human right on its own. Rather, its control can help further a
variety of human rights if targeted at areas where corruption
undermines rights.1 In choosing between means, one should trace
the link between policy initiatives and outcomes—often a difficult
job, because information on the costs and benefits of alternatives is
often hard to obtain.
Finally, what do international actors contribute? International
actors are constrained by their own distinctive institutional and
resource limitations. For example, there is some evidence that
presidential democracies are more corruption-prone than
parliamentary systems.2 However, no international institution is
prepared to encourage regime change of that sort—except perhaps
in a post-revolutionary or post-conflict situation, where the
country itself is rethinking its constitutional arrangements.3 Even
1 See John Dugard, Corruption: Is There a Need for a New Convention?, in ANTICORRUPTION POLICY: CAN INTERNATIONAL ACTORS PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE? 159
(Susan Rose-Ackerman & Paul Carrington eds., forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter,
ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY] (discussing how corruption can undermine human
rights but arguing that corruption should not be treated as a per se human rights
violation).
2 See generally Jana Kunicová & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Electoral Rules and
Constitutional Structure as Constraints on Corruption, 35 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 573 (2005)
(providing statistical evidence that presidential democracies are likely to be more
corrupt than parliamentary systems).
See also, Tina Søreide, Democracy’s
Shortcomings in Anti-Corruption, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 129, supra note 1
(contending that a democratic system with checks and balances may not suffice to
combat corruption).
3 Of course, constitutions are amended and replaced with some frequency,
for example, in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union and
democratization of Eastern Europe and in the current Middle East. The changes,
however, may enhance, not limit, rent-seeking possibilities. Thus, in Africa over
the last three decades, eighteen of twenty-one countries that began the postcolonial period as parliamentary democracies shifted to presidential systems. See
James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, Endogenous Presidentialism 34 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14603, 2008). A majority of those that
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if outsiders take the fundamental constitutional structure as given,
they can point out particular risks and recommend ways to limit
corruption within constitutional constraints.4
In short, international institutions face a linked set of issues:
from defining the underlying problem, to defining corruption and
understanding how it can exacerbate (or defuse) the problem, to
seeking policy levers that might limit the impact of corruption,
and, finally, to identifying appropriate routes for international
influence. These complexities and tensions are disguised if anticorruption goals are formulated at too high a level of generality.
But once international actors move to concrete initiatives,
limitations of knowledge and capacity will become apparent, and
conflicts between different types of anti-corruption efforts will
surface.
Section 1 presents a taxonomy of international actors involved
in anti-corruption activity. Section 2 connects corruption policy to
its ultimate objectives: global market efficiency, economic growth,
poverty alleviation, and government legitimacy. Section 3 links
international anti-corruption initiatives with these underlying
goals. Finally, section 4 broadens the focus by moving beyond
illegal corruption to consider the legal routes through which
private wealth can influence public power.
1.

INTERNATIONAL ACTORS: A TAXONOMY

Four types of international actors play important roles, but they
do not always agree on anti-corruption priorities and strategies.
First, and most obvious, are the aid and lending organizations—
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank,
and bilateral donors.
They sponsor governance and anticorruption projects in member countries and also seek to avoid
corruption in their own lending and grant programs. They
switched are resource rich, suggesting choices consistent with results cited by
Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 579, 587–600 (linking corruption to
the diversion of public resources for self-interested uses and subsequently
connecting corruption with presidentialism). Robinson and Torvik develop a
model where the constitutional structure is endogenous to the level of rents
available to political elites.
4 For a study that takes this point of view, see, e.g., Joseph Ayee et al.,
Political Economy of the Mining Sector in Ghana 1 (World Bank, Policy Research
Working Paper No. 5730, 2011) (arguing for “appropriate reforms” in Ghana’s
governance and “greater awareness of incentive problems at the political level
and their possible implications for sector performance and the economy at large”).
The study is, of course, a working paper, not a statement of World Bank policy.
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support reforms that aim to limit corrupt incentives and to
improve domestic oversight of the public sector. Programs seek to
reform government service delivery and establish accountability
institutions.5 Sometimes programs directly target domestic anticorruption laws and law enforcement systems. The IFIs also seek
to enforce their own “law” that forbids payoffs and kickbacks.6
They are concerned with the goals of economic growth and
poverty alleviation, but also with the integrity and legitimacy of
their own governance structures.
The second set is directly concerned with civil and criminal law
enforcement across borders.
There are two institutional
frameworks. One focuses on catching and punishing miscreants
using the civil and the criminal law. The offenders are firms
engaged in international business, the firms’ managers, organized
crime groups, and country leaders who enrich themselves through
kickbacks and extortion. These institutions provide information on
national legal regimes covering money laundering, asset recovery,
and extradition, and they may help train prosecutors and police for
domestic anti-corruption work. They generally do not have an
explicit development or poverty alleviation agenda.
The other international legal regime resolves commercial
disputes. Corruption may have facilitated a disputed contract up
front, but the international arbitration system has only recently
5 Two chapters in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY highlight aspects of this work at
the World Bank. See, Jana Kunicová, The Role of the World Bank in Promoting Good
Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms: A View from the Europe and Central Asia
Region, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 41, supra note 1 (exploring the World Bank’s
efforts to fortify public financial management and service delivery, among other
aspects of governance); Francesca Recanatini, Tackling Corruption and Promoting
Better Governance: The Road Ahead, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 55, supra note 1
(discussing World Bank efforts to promote ownership and sustainability of anticorruption reforms by governments). See also Francesca Recanatini, Assessing
Corruption at the Country Level, in HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL RESEARCH AND PRACTICE IN
CORRUPTION 34 (Adam Graycar & Russell G. Smith eds., 2011) (describing a
diagnostic tool that uses empirical data to establish corruption reform goals
specific to individual countries).
6 See, e.g., Int’l Bank for Reconstruction & Dev. [IBRD] & Int’l Dev. Ass’n
[IDA], World Bank Sanctions Procedures, WORLD BANK (Jan. 1, 2011) (setting forth a
sanctions regime for misuse of World Bank funds through fraud or corruption).
See also, Pascale Hélène Dubois & Aileen Elizabeth Nowlan, Global Administrative
Law and the Legitimacy of Sanctions Regimes in International Law, 36 YALE J. INT’L L.
ONLINE 15 (2010), http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-36-dubois-nowlan-globaladministrative-law-sanctions.pdf (explaining the World Bank’s sanctions
procedures). More information is available at the website of the World Bank’s
investigative unit. See Integrity Vice Presidency, WORLD BANK, http://www.World
bank.org/integrity (last visited May 5, 2013).
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recognized a responsibility to deal with such allegations and to
provide damages ex post. Even when it does confront the issue, the
existing arbitration system is not well equipped to investigate and
punish corruption, which often falls under the criminal law.
Arbitrators, however, are beginning to seek ways to respond
constructively. Going beyond the commercial arbitration regime,
private litigants are seeking other forms of redress before
international tribunals and ordinary domestic courts, sometimes
invoking private rights of action under existing statutes.
One justification for strengthened international law
enforcement is to level the playing field for multinational firms so
that honest firms do not operate at a disadvantage. If leveling
down is unacceptable, honest global actors may seek to level up.
The goal is a more competitive and transparent global marketplace
for trade and investment. The international legal regime does not
deal with the root causes of poverty but, rather, seeks to deter
high-level corruption by making it costly and risky. Economic
development and poverty alleviation may also be furthered if it
becomes more difficult for corrupt leaders to operate with
impunity and to transfer their gains abroad with ease. The result
may be better and more fairly distributed economic outcomes.
The third set of institutional actors is a diverse group of
international nonprofit institutions with an anti-corruption and
good government agenda, including organizations that support
investigative journalism and freedom of the press. Here I would
also include individual investigative journalists and writers, some
associated with major for-profit media outlets and others operating
on a free-lance basis. These diverse institutions have no official
role within states or internationally; they obtain their legitimacy
from their own integrity and the convincing nature of their
arguments and information they disclose. They operate through
franchises in the form of local chapters, such as Transparency
International; seek the cooperation of businesses and governments
through a standard-setting and monitoring process, such as the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (“EITI”); gather and
organize country-level data, such as Global Integrity; and expose
corruption and other forms of wrongdoing, such as Global
Witness.7 Most groups straddle several of these categories. Global
7 Transparency International is an anti-corruption organization with more
than one hundred national chapters worldwide. See Our Organisation: Overview,
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation
(last visited May 5, 2013). The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
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Witness, for example, has no national chapters, but uses exposés as
a way to push for policy changes and to promote institutional
reforms such as the EITI.8
These unofficial groups operate variously as pressure groups
that seek to put corruption on the reform agenda of other
institutions, and as information-providers that put domestic
reform efforts in an international context and publicize both
positive and negative developments. They may support research
on the causes and consequences of corruption and on the effect of
reforms, but faced with budgetary limits and the need to
demonstrate progress to funders, they sometimes must trade off
long-term research projects against short-term efforts to influence
current debate.9 They differ in their degree of confrontation with
sitting governments. Some groups have tried to build broad
coalitions to counteract the power of corrupt elites without openly
challenging them or by trying to co-opt them into anti-corruption
initiatives. Others focus on exposing corruption and using
scandals as a mechanism to raise public awareness so that people
will push for change. Each has risks. The former strategy risks
giving cover to ongoing corrupt arrangements; the latter risks
increasing public cynicism by revealing the pervasive character of
official malfeasance.
Fourth and finally, international business firms work through
some of the nonprofit groups listed above.
Transparency
International-USA, for example, operates with extensive business
“is a coalition of governments, companies, civil society groups, investors and
international organizations.” What is the EITI?, EITI, http://eiti.org/eiti (last
visited May 5, 2013). Global Integrity annually investigates the “transparency of
the public procurement process, media freedom, asset disclosure requirements,
[and] conflicts of interest regulations” in dozens of countries. See GLOBAL
INTEGRITY REPORT, http://www.globalintegrity.org/report (last visited May 5,
2013). Global Witness is an organization that investigates and exposes natural
resource-related conflict and corruption. See Our Work, GLOBAL WITNESS,
http://www.globalwitness.org/ (last visited May 5, 2013)
8 Thus, Global Witness’s Publish What You Pay (PWYP) campaign led to the
establishment of the PWYP coalition, which, in turn, led to the creation of the
EITI. See History, PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY, http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/
about/history (last visited May 5, 2013); History of EITI, EITI,
http://eiti.org/eiti/history (last visited May 5, 2013).
9 Global Witness (“GW”) has avoided these tradeoffs by planning long-term
campaigns and raising money to finance them up front, and then reporting on
their progress. GW integrates long-term campaigns (the oldest is sixteen years)
with case studies that further inform its demands for policy change. Short-term
gains are steps on the way to long-term objectives. See E-mail from Patrick Alley,
Co-founder, Global Witness, to author (Aug. 12, 2011) (on file with author).
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support and board membership because U.S. multi-nationals,
subject to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, have an interest
in controlling corruption in business worldwide. Other firms work
with business associations, such as the International Chamber of
Commerce or their own trade associations, to promote codes of
good conduct and promote anti-corruption policies. Voluntary
initiatives, such as the EITI, provide public relations benefits for
firms that comply with their standards. Top management and
board members of a few global firms have spoken out individually
in support of strong anti-corruption policies. Business interests
both interact with, and are in some tension with, the other actors
listed above. Sometimes preventing corruption in global business
improves a firm’s profits; at other times it limits their trade and
investment opportunities.
2.

GOALS AND STRATEGIES

How can anti-corruption initiatives further the fundamental
goals of efficient international markets, poverty alleviation,
economic growth, and government legitimacy? I outline general
approaches here that may or may not involve international
institutions. My discussion is necessarily brief, but it draws on a
body of research that has deepened and developed exponentially
in recent years. This summary sets the stage for consideration of
specific international responses in Section 3.
2.1. Efficient International Markets
Anti-corruption efforts can promote efficiency in international
markets.
High-level international corruption may suppress
competition in global markets by discouraging some investors
from taking advantage of otherwise profitable opportunities.
Corrupt rulers may commit their countries to foolish, uneconomic
public projects that place a burden on taxpayers into the future and
that starve needed services, such as education and health. With
widespread corruption, even nominally beneficial infrastructure
projects, such as roads, bridges, port facilities, or power plants,
may be too large, poorly located, and shabbily constructed.
Because of underlying monopoly power, some corrupt deals
may just redistribute profits between multi-national corporations
(“MNCs”) and corrupt officials with no impact on market
efficiency. In such cases, the fundamental inefficiency arises from
monopoly power, not bribery. However, this inefficiency seems to
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be a special case; in general, corrupt public officials and their
business firm counterparts can exclude competitors and can
influence the content of contracts, not just the price. They have
incentives to distort public choices in order to increase the rents
available to share and in order to design projects where bribes are
easy to hide—for example, one-of-a-kind capital-intensive projects
that are poorly adapted to local conditions.
Efficient international markets can promote growth in low- and
middle-income countries if they lower transaction costs and reduce
the risks of trade and investment. However, the evidence suggests
that free trade and open investment are not sufficient to secure
growth if poor governance is pervasive. A corrupt but stable
country could be quite attractive to investors even if few of the
benefits of its activity flow to local businesses and ordinary
citizens. Consider, for example, the cases of Greece and Italy,
which were able to borrow billions on international markets in
spite of high levels of corruption and otherwise dysfunctional
governments.10 When corrupt or self-serving leaders set priorities,
there are both efficiency and distributive consequences. Those
individuals in power favor projects that benefit them, neglecting
investments with larger social gains that would be more broadly
distributed. Thus, those whose primary focus is on economic
growth, poverty alleviation, or good government will not be
content with an international anti-corruption strategy that
concentrates on international business deals. International actors
should not just focus on a country’s levels of foreign direct
investment (FDI) as a measure of success. They need to examine
the impact of FDI on ordinary people and the local business
climate; they need to ask if corruption at the top has limited the
flow of benefits to the citizenry.
2.2. Economic Growth and Poverty Alleviation
Broadly speaking, if economic growth and poverty alleviation
are the main goals, then anti-corruption efforts enter the picture to
assure that poor citizens, as well as domestic small- and mediumsized business, benefit from development. Anti-corruption efforts
are necessary, but not sufficient: local officials must also deliver
public services competently. An abrupt drop in corruption
10 For a popular account of the Greek case, see Michael Lewis, Beware of
Greeks Bearing Bonds, VANITY FAIR (Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.vanityfair.com/
business/features/2010/10/greeks-bearing-bonds-201010.print.
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without affirmative efforts to assure competence can have
disastrous consequences. Because corruption is a symptom of a
poorly functioning government, reform programs should never
simply target law enforcement. They should be part of a broader
effort to change the way state officials interact with society.11
A first round of reforms should examine corrupt programs to
see whether some might simply be eliminated along with their
corrupt incentives. This initial step could lead either to the repeal
of certain rules and regulations or to the privatization of whole
sectors under public ownership. This strategy implies both that
such programs, even if honestly administered, do not serve
important public purposes and that repeal lowers overall
corruption, rather than just shifting it someplace else.12 But
privatization brings its own problems. If public firms are
privatized with their monopoly power intact, commercial bribery
may replace public corruption as suppliers jockey for advantage
and private monopoly profits substitute for payoffs. Even if a
public monopoly is broken up in the privatization process, the
resulting entities may operate corruptly by obtaining contracts
through bribery and debasing product quality.13 Thus, the risk of
shrinking the state as an anti-corruption strategy provides a stark
reminder that anti-corruption policies need to be embedded in a
broader context of overall government functioning. A narrow
focus on limiting corruption can backfire.14

11 The arguments summarized here are developed in SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN,
CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 9–68 (1999).
For an overview of empirical studies of corruption and reform efforts in particular
contexts, see Susan Rose-Ackerman & Rory Truex, Corruption and Policy Reform, in
GLOBAL PROBLEMS, SMART SOLUTIONS: COSTS AND BENEFITS (Bjørn Lomborg ed.,
forthcoming 2013).
12 See Liam Wren-Lewis, Anti-Corruption Policy in Regulation and Procurement:
The Role of International Actors, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 91, 97–98, supra note 1.
13 See generally LAURENCE COCKCROFT, GLOBAL CORRUPTION: MONEY, POWER
AND ETHICS IN THE MODERN WORLD (2012) (illustrating this concept with examples
of cotton ginners in Tanzania who adulterated their cotton and pharmaceutical
companies in China that bribed hospitals).
14 For recent research that emphasizes this general point, see Emmanuelle
Auriol & Stéphane Staub, Privatization of Rent-Generating Industries and Corruption,
in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION, VOLUME II 207
(Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina Søreide eds., 2011); Antonio Estache & Liam WrenLewis, Anti-Corruption Policy in Theories of Sector Regulation, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION, VOLUME II 269 (Susan RoseAckerman & Tina Søreide eds., 2011); Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, Corruption
and Collusion: Strategic Complements in Procurement, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK
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Second, a country can reduce corruption by repealing laws
protecting the environment or preserving public health or by
eliminating taxes—but at an unacceptable loss in public welfare.
In such cases, structural reforms can reduce corrupt incentives and
provide public benefits. Countries can simplify these regulations
and tax laws so that officials have less discretion, and so that
outsiders can easily observe violations. If some rules are so
stringent that organizations and individuals routinely violate them
in return for payoffs, the law should be redesigned to make
compliance plausible. For example, in some post-communist
states, tax collection descended into a vicious spiral where high tax
rates led to widespread violations, fueled by payoffs. The resulting
inadequate level of revenues led to further increases in tax rates,
encouraging even more taxpayers to pay off tax collectors. It
would have been better to lower tax rates and increase support for
a credible anti-corruption effort.
Third, scarcity spurs payoffs. If a public benefit is not available
to all who can qualify and if it is allocated at the discretion of
officials, bribes can allocate the benefit to the unscrupulous
applicants who are willing to pay the most. Legalizing the
payments can limit corruption—for example, by auctioning off the
benefit to the high bidders. This change would expand the pool of
beneficiaries to include all who are willing to pay, not just those
willing to break the law. The problem, of course, is that many
public programs are not meant to benefit those willing to pay the
most for them. Benefits for businesses, such as quotas for the
import of capital goods or licenses to harvest timber consistent
with environmental values, might be auctioned off with a gain to
the Treasury and no loss of social value. Auctioning off places in
public housing, eligibility for university places, or access to a
limited public health benefit, however, will undermine the
redistributive or merit-based goals of such programs. In those
cases, countries must deal with corruption through techniques that
mix monitoring with program redesign to limit official discretion.
The state can monitor internally or encourage whistleblowers who
earn rewards for their activities. Furthermore, even when auctions
appear efficient or socially acceptable—for example, in the
allocation of limited timber concessions or capital imports—the
state should assure that the winners do not engage in corruption ex
ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION, VOLUME II 108 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina
Søreide eds., 2011).

ON THE
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post to increase their profits. For example, they might mislabel
capital imports or tropical timber exports and then pay off customs
agents to overlook their behavior.
Fourth, a fully compromised bureaucracy may need to be
replaced wholesale. For example, the Georgian government fired
all its traffic police and then rehired one-third of them, seeking to
disrupt established patterns of corruption by giving the police new
cars and uniforms and hoping to instill a new pride in honest
service.15 This change in attitudes required both personnel changes
and changes in the mode of operation. Gradual change is not
feasible if the system is in a low-level trap where corrupt
expectations build on themselves.
2.3. Government Legitimacy
Governments appear more legitimate to their citizens if they
are more open and transparent and have established ways for
citizens to hold officials accountable. Of course, political leaders
might manipulate information and access to persuade the public to
support a secretive regime, but such a state hardly counts as a
legitimate expression of popular will. In addition to the key role of
elections, other institutions help citizens monitor the state, and
they deserve support even in non-democratic regimes. These
institutions include freedom of information acts, ombudsmen, and
independent oversight bodies such as audit agencies, electoral
commissions, anti-corruption commissions, and constitutional
courts. Laws governing conflicts of interests and ethical standards
for civil servants, politicians, and business people can also help.
The protection of whistleblowers can complement these efforts by
encouraging those inside government to come forward without
fear of losing their jobs and by rewarding those in the private
sector who report malfeasance. Whistleblowers are often looked
on with distaste, especially in societies where loyalty to kin and
close associates is a primary value. However, such protections are
necessary to break up the tight links that permit corruption and
self-dealing to become entrenched. Even so, they are of little
practical use unless the law enforcement system operates well. If
15 WORLD BANK, FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC SERVICES: CHRONICLING
GEORGIA’S REFORMS 15–18 (2012), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/01/20/000356161_201201
2001093/Rendered/PDF/664490PUB0EPI0065774B09780821394755.pdf
(summarizing the reforms to the traffic police).
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the system does not, corrupt allegations can serve as a simple,
convenient way to take revenge on a rival.
Some countries have adequate laws on the books, and these
countries may even enforce these laws relatively well against lowlevel offenders. The government then argues that it is successfully
tackling corruption. In practice, however, one law exists for civil
servants and another for top officials. Above a certain level, the
political elite may operate with impunity. Sectoral reform does not
touch such self-dealing. The phenomenon is particularly common
in resource-rich states where concessions for oil and other minerals
are handled at the highest levels and often involve generous
signing bonuses that may or may not be kept secret. Sometimes
the payoffs are so much a part of ordinary practice that they are
not illegal even though they obviously only benefit the leadership.
Their transparency hardly matters because there are no effective
mechanisms for the citizenry to hold leaders to account.16
2.4. Post-Conflict Countries
Post-conflict countries are a special case where both political
and economic rebuilding must occur and where weak institutions
combine with financial inflows to create corrupt opportunities.
The large influx of foreign funds in a short time frame makes
control difficult but also extremely important. Evidence from
many post-conflict countries such as Guatemala, Burundi, and
Angola, as well as Iraq and Afghanistan, suggests that corruption
is often a serious problem that may undermine the credibility of
both the post-conflict government and international donors. If a
foreign military presence follows conflict, corrupt deals may
involve its contractors, both domestic and international,
undermining the legitimacy of the rebuilding effort.17
16 See, e.g., Ayee et al., supra note 4, at 20–21 (reporting on the lack of vertical
and horizontal controls of political corruption in Ghana, generally and in specific
industries); Tina Søreide et al., Chr. Michelson Inst. & Centro de Estudos e
Investigação Científica, Public Construction Projects—Angola: A Need to Fortify the
Barriers Against Corruption, 1 ANGOLA BRIEF 1 (2011), available at http://www.
cmi.no/publications/file/4019-public-construction-projects-angola.pdf (outlining
a similar struggle in Angola).
17 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption in the Wake of Domestic National
Conflict, in CORRUPTION, GLOBAL SECURITY, AND WORLD ORDER 66 (Robert I. Rotberg
ed., 2009); Raymond June & Nathaniel Heller, Corruption and Anti-Corruption in
Peacebuilding: Toward a Unified Framework, 14 NEW ROUTES 10, 11 (2009) (stating
that peace building efforts are at risk of corruption, especially given that these
efforts rarely include a strong anti-corruption component); STUART W. BOWEN, JR.,
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2.5. Structural Reform, Culture, and Law Enforcement
States will have difficulty implementing anti-corruption
reforms successfully if officials and ordinary citizens accept
bribery, cronyism, and favoritism as facts that keep the system
running, and if they view some forms of special treatment as
desirable because, for example, they further kinship or ethnic ties.
However, anthropological work shows that people may
simultaneously accept and condemn corruption. They condemn
the malfeasance of their political leaders but spend their lives in a
This paradox
world full of favoritism and rule-breaking.18
suggests that if reformers do come to power, they need to work
hard to inform citizens of the overall social costs of corruption. At
the same time, they need to implement a credible criminal and civil
law enforcement regime that ends the impunity of public and
private actors.19 Once corruption has become a risky activity,
reformers can then get public support to redesign programs so that
honest people can operate without looking like dupes or suckers.
The structural approach developed in this essay suggests that pure
efforts at moral reform and law enforcement are unlikely to be
effective unless underlying changes in government functioning
make it is relatively easy and cheap to be honest.
3.

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

A range of nonprofit international institutions, including IFIs,
civil society groups, treaties, and dispute resolution systems,
confront corruption either as a primary goal or as a complement to
their main activity. These institutions act in many different ways.
HARD LESSONS: THE IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION EXPERIENCE 6 (2009), available at
http://www.sigir.mil/publications/hardLessons.html (explaining that, as the
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Bowen faced
“[i]nstitutionalized corruption infect[ing] both the government [of Iraq] and the
supporting UN programs”).
18 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: Greed, Culture, and the State, 120
YALE L. J. ONLINE 125, 130 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/11/10/roseackerman.html (“Ordinary people condemn corruption at the elite level, but they
themselves participate in networks that socially reproduce corruption.”).
19 Effective law enforcement, of course, does not mean zero corruption
because, as Johann Graf Lambsdorff points out, such enforcement could result in
costs that are relatively high compared to the benefits. He recommends various
ways to destabilize the corrupt relationship so that participants become unsure
that the other person will reciprocate. Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Securing Investor
Confidence or Fighting Corruption? How Intergovernmental Organizations May
Reconcile Two Opposing Goals, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 215, supra note 1.
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They carry out concrete reform programs in an effort to strengthen
government capacity. They train domestic officials, journalists,
and civil society to identify and publicize corruption, and they
monitor international financial flows and business deals for
evidence of corruption. Other institutions provide a framework for
resolving cross-border commercial disputes, seek to persuade other
international actors—notably, business and financial firms—to
adopt a broader view of their social obligations, and produce and
disseminate information on corruption, government quality, and
successful reforms.
For-profit international actors—including global business
firms, financial institutions, as well as organized crime—may be
embedded in corrupt networks that they either struggle against or
actively promote. Business and financial firms may try to remain
within the law by creative organizational and legal strategies.
Terrorist groups and guerilla armies may finance their activities
through the undercover sales of natural resources, using
corruption to smooth their operations. International actors may
sometimes contribute to the corrupt environment; if so, they have a
special obligation to counteract these tendencies, perhaps in
cooperation with nonprofit institutions that focus on limiting
corruption.
The options for international actors fall into three broad
categories: information provision, international frameworks, and
domestic reform projects.20 They range from those likely to
generate little pushback from domestic actors, to those that depend
on the voluntary participation of nation states, to efforts to reform
a state’s internal methods of operation. Not all of these policies are
explicitly aimed at limiting corruption; the underlying goals
sketched previously may be the explicit justification for programs
whose proximate effect is to reduce corruption.
Table 1 presents the three policy goals as columns and the three
broad types of international action as rows.21 This produces nine
options but, in practice, there are only six important categories.
The blank spaces are not absolutely empty. Rather, policies
discussed under one category may have an indirect effect on
20 See also the somewhat different framework in Wren-Lewis, supra note 12,
(distinguishing between providing aid to governments that are actively fighting
corruption and to those which do not prioritize such reforms).
21 I list growth and poverty alleviation together, recognizing that a more
complete analysis ought to treat them separately because growth can occur at the
same time as poverty rates stagnate or increase.
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another. For example, an anti-corruption program directed toward
promoting economic growth in poor countries (case E) may
enhance competitiveness and contribute to the development of
more efficient global markets. The discussion is organized by
strategies to highlight the possible tensions between the activities
of international institutions and the aims of powerful domestic
political and economic actors, some of whom may be involved in
corrupt activities and all of whom are eager to defend national
sovereignty against outside meddling. Other international actors,
such as organized crime bodies, terrorist groups, and corrupt
multinational firms, may seek to undermine reform efforts. In the
most difficult cases, they ally with domestic groups that benefit
from the corrupt status quo.
Table 1: International Initiatives
Goals →
Strategies ↓
Information
Provision
International
Institutions
Anti-Corruption
Programs

Growth &
Poverty
Alleviation

Government
Legitimacy

A

B
C

E

Efficient
International
Markets

D

F

3.1. Information Provision [Cases A&B]
Information provision seems relatively unproblematic because
it simply aids domestic policymakers and leaves it to them to use
or ignore this material as they wish.22 There is no conditionality
and no direct funding for governments or domestic groups.
However, although information provision is relatively
unobtrusive, gathering that information can be fraught with
controversy. Three sorts of information are relevant: social science
evaluations of reform policies, cross-country data on corruption
levels and government quality, and investigative reporting by
journalists or advocacy groups. This material can contribute to
See Wren-Lewis, supra note 12, at 95–96 (arguing that providing access to
adequate information may lead to reduced corruption).
22
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both economic and political reform so I consider these two goals
together (cases A and B).
3.1.1. Social Science Information
Information about possible policy initiatives needs to be
grounded in valid studies that document the success or failure of
policies in a variety of settings. Results in one country can help
establish benchmarks for reforms elsewhere.
To do this,
governments must cooperate with donors up-front in the design of
projects that include competent social science evaluations.
Unfortunately, evaluation may seem risky both to incumbent
politicians who fear objective data and to donors who worry that
evidence of failure will undermine their credibility. Even when
governments and donors cooperate, studies must comply with
social science protocols, including the collection of baseline data,
valid study design, and competent statistical analysis. This
compliance will require international institutions to design, carry
out and monitor pilot programs. Providing information on what
works and what does not is impossible without hands-on projects
in countries at risk of corruption.
There is an ongoing debate in economics and political science
over the best evaluation methods.
Nevertheless, there is
widespread agreement on the limitations of many current claims
for policy efficacy. International bodies, possessing staff expertise
in evaluation, need to do more to incorporate evaluation
procedures into projects for governance and anti-corruption
reform. This may require them to provide some tailored benefits
(“carrots”) to governments willing to accept evaluation as part of
an aid program and to incorporate the stick of reduced funding if
they do not. It is not sufficient merely to provide information
about on-going projects; the projects themselves must be set up
with built-in evaluation processes.
Assuming that these evaluations locate successful
interventions, IFI staff should bring these positive cases to the
attention of officials in other countries. At a minimum, IFIs should
be information banks that public officials worldwide can turn to
for help.23 IFIs should have a toolkit of options that developing
23 See Dani Rodrik, Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington
Confusion? A Review of the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning
from a Decade of Reform, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 973, 982–86 (2006) (arguing that
institutions such as the World Bank ought to tailor reform options based on
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countries can use to develop their domestic strategies. This does
not imply that one-size-fits-all. Some countries might well reject
particular reforms as incompatible with their own situation, but if
they want financial assistance from aid agencies, they should have
the burden of explaining why they won’t adopt good governance
and anti-corruption reforms shown to work elsewhere. The
difficulty, of course, is that corrupt officials and contractors will try
to neutralize and undermine programs that aim to improve
government accountability and transparency. Representatives of
donor agencies may be similarly reluctant to support serious and
systematic evaluation, especially after working closely with host
governments over the years.
At present, we still don’t have a good data on the relative
effectiveness of most reform programs.24 After fifteen years of
effort to promote anti-corruption and good governance, it would
be valuable to consolidate experience across projects sponsored by
aid and lending organizations—sharing successes, failures, and
ambiguous cases.
A fundamental problem concerns public
information that names countries and projects. Specific context is
needed to be able to decide if a program that worked in one
country will succeed elsewhere. Domestic policymakers need to
know how to evaluate programs that worked in other countries in
order to generate local buy-in. Yet, country leaders often object to
publicizing projects that will put them in a bad light. Publicizing
an anti-corruption program, even a successful one, may suggest
that corruption is a particular problem in that country.
Alternatively, incumbent politicians may be too eager to flag the
malfeasance of the previous government in the hope of assuring
their own reelection. Thus, some evaluations will be easier to
accomplish than others, and some political contexts will simply be
impossible to use as sites for evaluation studies.
individual country experiences, eschewing the so-called “Washington
Consensus”).
24 Nevertheless, some thoughtful efforts exist. For example, see JENNIFER
BUSSELL, CORRUPTION AND REFORM IN INDIA: PUBLIC SERVICE IN THE DIGITAL AGE
(2012) (evaluating the anti-corruption effects of one-stop-shops in India and
relating their impact to the political situation in the Indian states). For an
overview of recent studies that evaluate anti-corruption policy reforms, see REMA
HANNA ET AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY: WHAT HAS
WORKED, WHAT HASN’T, AND WHAT WE DON’T KNOW—A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW
(2011), available at http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/systematicreviews/anti_
corruption_2011hanna.pdf.
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In particular, to enhance government legitimacy (case B),
institutions that promote accountability and transparency need
more study. At a theoretical level, their role in promoting anticorruption and good governance seems clear, but we do not know
much about their practical operation, or about what conditions are
required to make them effective. Complicating any effort at solid
analysis, both country officials and representatives of donor
agencies may benefit from the lack of solid data on the effect of
good governance programs. Suppose, for example, that an anticorruption program involves a series of seminars and workshops
for public officials with per diems set to encourage attendance.
Given the lack of hard measures of corruption reduction,
attendance at these events may be reported as a measure of success
with the officials benefiting from the expense-paid trips.25
To begin to close this knowledge-gap, World Bank researchers
are studying the role of anti-corruption authorities (ACAs). They
find that the success or failure of ACAs depends crucially on the
national context, but they have also isolated common
characteristics that predict success.26
The World Bank has
launched a broader initiative to promote the demand for good
governance, and can point to some positive cases.27 However,
more research is needed both to conceptualize the way
accountability institutions operate and to understand how these
institutions behave in different national settings.

25 For a study about per diem compensation in connection with seminars and
workshops, see TINA SØREIDE, ARNE TOSTENSEN, & I.A. SKAGE, HUNTING FOR PER
DIEM: THE USES AND ABUSES OF TRAVEL COMPENSATION IN THREE DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (2012), available at http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/
publications/evaluations/publication?key=390706.
26 See Francesca Recanatini, Anti-corruption Authorities: An Effective Tool to
Curb Corruption?, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION,
VOLUME II, supra note 14, at 565 (describing political will and commitment as “the
cornerstone of every successful anti-corruption effort”). Recanatini chairs the
Anti-Corruption Thematic Group at the World Bank that is studying the
effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Authorities in collaboration with the United
Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, the U.S. State Department, and the European
Commission. Data from this project are available at http://www.acauthorities.
org.
27 See Social Accountability & Demand for Good Governance, THE WORLD BANK,
http://go.worldbank.org/09MJLAICW0 (last visited May 5, 2013) (highlighting
citizen-driven initiatives that seek to achieve better governance by engaging in
discussion and providing resources to others); see also Anticorruption, THE WORLD
BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/QYRWVXVH40 (last visited May 5, 2013)
(posting news articles about fighting corruption in different nations).
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Whatever other strategies are pursued, the compilation and
distribution of project-level information provide valuable
background information. But knowledge alone may have little
impact.
Corrupt officials and contractors may ignore the
information and continue to undermine development projects.
They may announce programs to improve government
accountability and transparency, and even draw on information
provided by international actors, but it all may be a sham designed
only to produce good publicity.
3.1.2. Cross-Country Data
Cross-country data can and should be produced independently
of individual country governments. These indices are likely to
provoke criticism from governments that score poorly on
dimensions such as the control of corruption, voice and
accountability, and money laundering. The weaknesses of indices
that purport to capture a country’s overall level of corruption are
well known, but this data has, nevertheless, helped to spur the
global debate and given reformers in poorly ranked countries a
lever to push for change. The more important these indices
become in shaping policy, the more important it is that they bear
some relationship to reality and do not convey a false sense of
precision.28
Anti-corruption programs, even seemingly successful ones, do
not quickly translate into improved index numbers. Unlike some
measures of macro-economic performances, the link between
policies and index numbers is weak. The indices are imperfect,
and the causal links between policies and corruption levels are
poorly understood. Cross-country data will continue to be
produced, and they help keep the issue before the public, but they
should be supplemented by project-level research that looks in
detail at causal links.
Sometimes
organizations
that
publish
cross-country
information go beyond the simple production of indices to apply
direct pressure on countries that score poorly. For example, the
28 See Kevin E. Davis, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry, Introduction:
Global Governance by Indicators, in GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER
THROUGH QUANTIFICATION AND RANKINGS 1, 9 (Kevin E. Davis et al. eds., 2012)
(“Indicators often have embedded within them . . . a much more far-reaching
theory—which some might call it an ‘ideology’—of what a good society is, or how
governance should ideally be conducted to achieve the best possible
approximation of a good society or good policy.”).
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Financial Action Task Force (FATF) not only scores countries on
their control of illicit financial flows, but also lists some as falling
below acceptable levels.29 Similarly, although they do not single
out especially bad actors, civil society organizations, such as
Transparency International and Global Integrity, nevertheless, use
their own and others’ data to argue for reform. They go beyond
the simple provision of information to advocate for change
through local chapters or through alliances with local actors.
Objective cross-country information about the possible results
of corruption and inefficiency can help spur reforms in individual
countries. International bodies could compile benchmark data on
the cost and performance of public projects to alert potential
whistleblowers and to provide ammunition to reformers.30 Data
on the costs of power projects, road building, hospital and school
construction, and port renewal, for example, could be assembled
from multiple sources. Defense spending is one area of particular
concern because of the secrecy that accompanies such purchases.
Nevertheless, even there, egregious examples of overpricing may
surface.31 Of course, the data would be quite rough and could not
be used to prove corruption on their own, but if the cost of one
country’s project is far out of line with the global benchmark, this
discrepancy could trigger an investigation. It operates like a red
flag.

29 See Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE
(July 2011), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/31/13/48472713.pdf
(measuring and analyzing political corruption’s link to money laundering across
countries).
30 See Wren-Lewis, supra note 12, at 100–01 (advocating for increased whistleblowing in order to increase available information, while also mentioning the
need for international organizations to make whistle-blowers feel safer). See
generally Miriam A. Golden & Lucio Picci, Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption,
Illustrated with Italian Data, 17 ECON. & POL. 37 (2005) (detailing efforts to detect
fraud by comparing productivity of public infrastructure spending across Italian
regions).
31 For example, Uganda recently purchased at least eight Russian fighter jets
for $744 million dollars. Nicholas Bariyo, Uganda Buys Fighter Jets, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 7, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704013604576248
094099823846.html.
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3.1.3 Investigative Reporting32
If the local media is weak and dependent either on the
government or on wealthy private interests, then outside actors
can help to support any remaining independent outlets and can
engage in reporting activities independent of local entities. These
groups might supply well-researched stories to local outlets. They
can be a place for whistleblowers to report and could provide
protection to those who reveal corruption when that is a risky
activity. They can seek reform in libel laws that make it easy for
journalists to “insult” the political and economic elite in ways that
“violate national sovereignty” and to be subject to fines and
imprisonment. One way to do this is to defend journalists under
these laws, publicize cases, and attempt to raise popular awareness
of the harm caused by such restrictive laws.33 These actions will be
controversial. Sitting governments are unlikely to welcome
investigative reporting and whistle blowing from any source
unless it reveals malfeasance by political opponents. International
actors may be accused of meddling in domestic politics, and their
domestic counterparts may be labeled enemies of the state and
tools of external interests. This puts a high premium on getting the
facts rights and providing documentation that insiders can use to
work for reform. Otherwise, news reports risk manipulation by
insiders eager to discredit each other. The basic reality is that anticorruption strategies always have political overtones even if the
targets are low-level officials. The stakes are especially high,
however, if the targets are political leaders, private sector elites, or
multi-national firms.
International actors may also be able to help local media make
effective use of new electronic sources of communication and to
help members of the public participate in newsgathering and
dissemination, what Alan Rusbridger calls “the mutualization” of
the news.34 The line between journalists and the public is
32 In this section I draw heavily from Michela Wrong’s work regarding
media’s role in exposing corruption. See Michela Wrong, How International Actors
Can Help the Media in Developing Countries Play a Stronger Role in Combating
Corruption, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 103, supra note 1.
33 See REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, http://en.rsf.org (last visited May 5,
2013) (supporting reporters assigned to dangerous areas and combating
censorship of print and digital media).
34 Alan Rusbridger, The Splintering of the Fourth Estate, THE GUARDIAN
(Manchester), Nov. 19, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/
nov/19/open-collaborative-future-journalism; see also COCKCROFT, supra note 13.
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becoming blurred. Although the media’s influence is deeply
dependent upon its local character, outsiders can help with
training and by providing software to facilitate the move away
from conventional media to “social media.”
3.1.4. Links between Information Provision Strategies
In practice, the three forms of information provision are
interrelated. Journalists publicize research results and help make
the data salient. They use cross-country indices and evaluation
reports to suggest where to probe further. Conversely, scandals
uncovered by journalists and advocacy organizations can prompt
more systematic social science research. Activists and the media
may be impatient with the caution that researchers display in
expressing strong conclusions, but over the past two decades,
social scientists have given credibility to the alarms raised by
investigative reporting. Furthermore, “grand” corruption at the
top of the state is not easily amenable to statistical analysis, but it
may be the most harmful to a country struggling to escape from
poverty or the ravages of war. It can be revealed both by the
investigative reporting of journalists and NGOs, and by lawsuits
that reveal corrupt dealings.
3.2. International Actions to Control Corruption [Cases C & D]
International institutions can supplement domestic anticorruption efforts without directly intervening in domestic
practices. A country that ratifies a treaty or joins a cooperative
effort may commit to domestic anti-corruption policies, but it does
this voluntarily as part of its responsibilities under the
international body’s rules.
There are two main types of international bodies: multinational
bodies that coordinate and supplement local anti-corruption and
good governance efforts, including those based on domestic
criminal law, and bodies that have independent authority to
resolve cross-border commercial disputes where corruption may
be alleged. The first strategy will mainly supplement domestic
efforts to control corruption (case C). The second may help as well,
but its primary aim is to resolve disputes so as to promote the
efficiency of international markets (case D). Some of these bodies
are established by treaty. Others are the result of voluntary efforts
by states or private parties.
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3.2.1. International Support for Domestic Efforts [Case C]
Some international institutions concentrate on promoting the
legitimacy and transparency of domestic governments, using a
variety of approaches.
I discuss international professional
networks, voluntary business standards, and help for domestic law
enforcement efforts.
3.2.1.1. Professional Networks
Global professional associations of comptrollers general,
ombudsmen, electoral commissioners, and other public officials
meet to share ideas and to establish codes of ethics and good
practice.35 These bodies also provide training for officials in
emerging economies, and support embattled incumbents whose
independence is threatened.
Similarly, international civil society organizations, not
connected with governments, help their non-governmental
counterparts working in difficult environments. For example,
international associations of journalists provide training in
investigative reporting and can also supply legal advice and
international publicity to newspapers facing government
harassment. Advocacy groups can support and train domestic
civil society activists and help to protect those who face criticism
and even arrest in hostile environments.
3.2.1.2. Voluntary Business Initiatives
Several efforts are underway to obtain the voluntary
cooperation of businesses.
The International Chamber of
Commerce has established a code of conduct for firms. The United
Nations Global Compact and ISO 26000 encourage firms to sign on
to a set of ethical principles including anti-corruption.36 The Global
Compact contracted with Transparency International in 2009 to
produce a guidance document for firms, but the process is just
beginning, and the groups’ websites are not very informative. As
Tina Søreide has pointed out, the incentives of top firm managers
may not align with those lower down, employees may be reluctant
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 126 (2004).
See UN GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited
May 5, 2013); Int’l Org. for Standardization, Guidance on Social Responsibility, ISO
26000 (July 1, 2008), available at https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:26000:
ed-1:v1:en.
35
36
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to speak out, and legal systems differ in the way they apply anticorruption laws to organizations and employees.37 Nevertheless,
the ongoing efforts are a positive step.
A recent endeavor, the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI) seeks greater transparency in corporate/country
agreements in the mining, oil, and gas industries. The EITI does
not measure corruption directly. The goal is to permit individuals
and advocacy groups to monitor the flow of funds with the aim of
benefitting the citizens of countries with valuable resources. This
effort grew out of the Publish What You Pay initiative that targeted
only multi-national firms. Under EITI, countries can become
candidate countries, and then have two and half years to propose
plans that are compliant with EITI standards. These standards
focus on transparent reporting and auditing of payments from
firms to countries. Firms that support the initiative must publish
what they pay to compliant countries and submit a self-assessment
to EITI.38
These efforts respond to the possibility that, for some
international deals, neither host country elites nor their
counterparts in the capital-providing nations have an interest in
revealing and limiting corruption unless pressured by outsiders.
Both buyers and sellers benefit from the weak legal environment in
host countries. The leaders of host countries enrich themselves,
and home countries support the business operations of their
multinational firms.
Generally, these monitoring mechanisms have no legal force,
but they can produce public relations difficulties for lagging firms
and countries. That is the goal of the EITI. Similarly, the FATF,
mentioned above, has no hard legal power but relies on the black
mark of a bad rating in the control of financial flows (money
laundering) to spur change. Other organizations may piggyback
off of these ratings in making decisions about funding and other
forms of engagement.39 Civil society bodies also rank countries on

37 Tina Søreide, The Governance of Infrastructure Regulation: An Economist’s
View, in EMERGING ISSUES IN COMPETITION, COLLUSION, AND REGULATION OF
NETWORK INDUSTRIES 191, 207–08 (Antonio Estache ed., 2011).
38 See, e.g., EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org (last
visited May 5, 2013).
39 Roberto de Michele, How Can International Financial Institutions Support
Countries’ Efforts to Prevent Corruption Under International Treaties and Agreements?,
in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 179, supra note 1.
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levels of corruption, government accountability, and freedom of
the press and media.
3.2.1.3. Treaties and Domestic Prosecutions of International
Offenses
International institutions and treaties help in the prosecution of
domestic corruption offenses and push cooperating states to
expand the reach of domestic law.
Interpol and the UN
Convention against Corruption require inter-state cooperation,
including extradition and help with asset recovery. Going further,
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) Convention against Corruption and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) procurement guidelines deal with corruption
that crosses national boundaries. The OECD Convention came into
force in 1999 and builds on the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1977. It requires ratifying countries to make it an offense for
their firms to pay bribes abroad to obtain and retain business, and
it also requires them to make the companies’ officials liable.40 The
OECD Convention is monitored by a Working Group whose only
sanction is bad publicity. Nevertheless, its actions appear to be
having an impact. The United States remains the most active
enforcer of the OECD Convention, but other countries are
beginning to bring cases, and the reach of the U.S. law is broad. In
addition, the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) requires firms in extractive
industries to file reports that mimic the EITI. It applies to all firms
listed on U.S. exchanges wherever their headquarters are located.
This development is an example of a “soft law” initiative becoming
hard law in one country. It may set an example for other countries,
and again, the reach of the U.S. law is broad because so many
multi-national firms are listed on U.S. exchanges.
In a few cases, the courts of one country, such as the United
States, can be used to address offenses that occurred in countries
with weak or corrupt judiciaries. Sometimes foreign courts help

40 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Apr. 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 4, available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,2340,en_2649_201185_2017813_1_1_1_1,0
0.html; Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1495
(1977). See Mark Pieth, From Talk to Action: The OECD Experience, in ANTICORRUPTION POLICY 151, supra note 1.
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with recovery of assets held abroad.41 Even the Swiss have
recently frozen questionable assets of deposed rulers and have
transferred those funds to incumbents who claim that the funds
belong to the state. The World Bank’s Stolen Asset Recovery
Initiative (StAR) aims to assist countries seeking to recover illicitly
appropriated assets, but the task is difficult.42 Sophisticated money
launderers hide funds in major financial centers, disguising the
funds’ origin through a chain of shell companies. Although
domestic actions can be useful in particular cases, especially when
aided by information from banking havens, they hardly represent
a general solution.43

41 Recently, the U. S. Supreme Court held that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to claims under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) in a case
outside the corruption area, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. __
(2013). The opinion below held that the ATS did not apply to corporations, Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F. 3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). However, that issue
was not resolved by the Supreme Court. The opinion in IV only states that mere
corporate presence was not sufficient for the ATS to apply, and the concurrence in
III found the corporate presence “minimal and indirect” because they only had
offices in New York and were traded on the New York Stock Exchange. See also
Doe v. Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011), and Flomo v. Firestone Nat.
Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011). In the former case the D.C. Circuit
held that the ATS applied to corporate conduct and allowed a case against Exxon
Mobil brought by Indonesian villagers claiming human rights violations to go
forward. The Seventh Circuit opinion held that the ATS applies to corporations
but that the plaintiffs, twenty-three Liberian children, had not shown that
Firestone violated customary international law. Other foreign litigants have used
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to seek damages
from companies under the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts that are alleged to have
engaged in corrupt or fraudulent behavior. For a recent example, see Ukrvaktsina
v. Olden Group, LLC, 2011 WL 5244697 (2011).
42 See THE WORLD BANK: STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY INITIATIVE (STAR),
http://star.worldbank.org/star (last visited May 7, 2013) (explaining the
assistance provided to countries seeking to recover assets). See generally Dubois &
Nowlan, supra note 6 (evaluating the effect of sanctions on fraud and corruption
in the World Bank’s poverty reduction efforts).
43 For an example of the reluctance of U.S. courts to judge the validity of
allegedly corrupt and fraudulent bankruptcies abroad, see generally Films by
Jove, Inc. v. Berov, 250 F. Supp. 2d 156 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). See also Vadim Volkov,
The Selective Use of State Capacity in Russia’s Economy: Property Disputes and
Enterprise Takeovers, 1998–2002, in CREATING SOCIAL TRUST IN POST-SOCIALIST
TRANSITION 126, 136, 146 n.15 (János Kornai et al. eds., 2004) (discussing the
background of Films by Jove v. Berov). For a discussion of tax havens, see generally
NICHOLAS SHAXSON, TREASURE ISLANDS: TAX HAVENS AND THE MEN WHO STOLE THE
WORLD (2010).
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3.2.1.4. Weaknesses in the Existing System
Kevin Davis critiques enforcement systems that depend too
heavily on international regimes.44 He worries that they will not
reflect domestic priorities in states where high-level corruption is
pervasive. He also argues that if a state relies too heavily on
international institutions to further anti-corruption aims, it may fail
to reform internally. International solutions need to be accountable
to the domestic public in deciding where and how to intervene.
Even on their own terms, the international instruments have
weaknesses. None has strong international legal mechanisms for
controlling corruption that crosses national borders. Even when
the offense occurs in connection with international trade or
investment, law enforcement is domestic.45 Indeed, the DoddFrank law has only a reporting requirement, although it could spur
investigations under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA).
Some international institutions help domestic efforts to fight
corruption, while others seek to improve state functioning.
Professional bodies share information and experiences and support
embattled domestic reformers. Extradition treaties and procedures
for sharing information via Interpol help local police and
prosecutors develop strong cases. The OECD Convention requires
signatories to make it a domestic offense for their businesses and
individuals to pay bribes abroad, but enforcement depends upon
prosecutorial priorities. There are no private rights of action for
either domestic or foreign individuals.
There are weaknesses on two fronts. First, the treaties and
institutions that seek to control international corruption are
voluntary systems that nation states join only if they are willing to
accept the treaties’ conditions. Second, domestic courts seldom
take on foreign bribery cases, unless they involve domestic firms
under the OECD Convention or concern the transfer of assets held
in a country’s financial institutions. Law enforcement bodies may
extradite accused offenders, but they do not bring the cases
themselves.
However, one system has legal force—the
international arbitration regime—to which I now turn.
44 See Kevin Davis, Does the Globalization of Anti-Corruption Law Help
Developing Countries?, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 169, supra note 1 (noting that
“relying on foreign institutions also has significant limitations”).
45 See Pieth, supra note 40 (pointing to these and other domestic enforcement
weaknesses while urging stronger actions to monitor and hold firms accountable).
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3.2.2. International Arbitration and Domestic Court Cases
[Case D]
The international arbitration regime is the main international
forum for resolving commercial disputes where corruption may be
alleged. Corruption, although recognized as an important issue,
remains a vexing and difficult problem for arbitrators, given their
insulation from domestic criminal law institutions.46 Nevertheless,
the institutions that organize arbitrations are stepping gingerly into
this arena as litigants seek to void contracts tainted by corruption.
As Mark Pieth writes, “Arbitration is no longer an exclusive area of
party-interest, especially as far as large infrastructure projects are
involved. It is right to consider corruption an issue of (domestic
and international) public interest.”47
One study identified thirty-eight international arbitration cases
that dealt with corruption,48 but the arbitral system has not yet
settled on an appropriate framework. In an ironic twist, the first
set of disputes arose between firms and their local intermediaries
who allegedly had paid bribes. The firms were seeking to avoid
paying their agents on the ground that bribery was illegal, even if

46 See Joost Pauwelyn, Different Means, Same End: The Contribution of Trade and
Investment Treaties to Anti-Corruption Policy, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 247, 261–
62, supra note 1 (arguing that an enforcement gap exists because arbitrators pursue
the same ends as domestic criminal institutions but pursue these ends through
different means). See generally Olaf Meyer, The Formation of a Transnational Ordre
Public against Corruption: Lessons for and from Arbitral Tribunals, in ANTICORRUPTION POLICY 229, supra note 1 (noting that arbitrators are still developing
standards for corruption cases). The other venue for settling international
economic disputes between states is the WTO. According to Pauwelyn, supra at
248, the term “corruption” did not appear in the WTO rulebook prior to the 2011
Plurilateral Government Procurement Agreement. WTO tribunals can consider
corruption to the extent that it affects trade, but their reach is limited insofar as
only nation states can bring claims, the tribunals only judge government conduct
and not the conduct of private parties, and the penalties involve only reciprocal
trade restrictions.
47 Mark Pieth, Contractual Freedom v. Public Policy Considerations in Arbitration,
in PRIVATE LAW: NATIONAL-GLOBAL-COMPARATIVE: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR INGEBORG
SCHWENZER ZUM 60. GEBURTSTAG 1375, 1385 (Andrea Büchler & Markus MüllerChen eds., 2011). See also Pauwelyn, supra note 46 (noting both the public and
private interests in reducing corruption).
48 Pauwelyn, 257, supra note 46 (“Olaya finds ‘approximately 38 international
arbitration cases . . . known to deal with corruption’”) (citing Juanita Olaya, Good
Governance and International Investment Law: The Challenges of Lack of Transparency
and Corruption, presented at The Second Biennial SIEL Conference (July 8–10,
2010)).
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they knew that payoffs were taking place.49 In such cases,
arbitrators generally refuse jurisdiction on the ground that they
have no authority to resolve criminal allegations. Going beyond
disgruntled intermediaries, the arbitral status of contracts allegedly
obtained by corruption is unclear, especially because they are
plagued by problems of proof. This result is unsatisfactory if the
corrupt nature of the deal has harmed the complainant and if the
domestic law enforcement system is dysfunctional or corrupt. In
many cases, neither the host state nor the international investor has
an interest in raising corruption charges—even if they can be
proved. The exception, which has arisen in a number of cases, is
when a new host government introduces evidence of corruption
under the previous regime.50
There are two types of forums. One is the private commercial
arbitration regime; the second, the World Bank’s International
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), only
considers cases where investors sue nation states, usually under
the provisions of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). In both cases,
private firms can initiate the arbitration process, but only if they
are parties to the contracts in question. Disappointed bidders, or
other outsiders to the contract, have no standing. Joost Pauwelyn
argues that BIT provisions requiring “fair and equitable treatment”
could be extended to cover corruption, but so far no cases have
made that connection.51
These weaknesses in the present system have led to reform
proposals that range from the more explicit incorporation of
corruption charges into the arbitral process to the creation of a
separate body, either a formal court or another type of arbitral
tribunal that would explicitly deal with claims that corruption
should void a contract or, at least, lead to its renegotiation.
Reforms may require structural changes. Paul Carrington, for
example, argues for a new international body to hear cases
initiated by outsiders to the deal. In the alternative, he suggests an
49 See Meyer, 232–34, supra note 46 (describing the types of corruption cases
often arising in arbitration).
50 For an example from ICSID, see World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya,
ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7 (Oct. 4, 2006) (voiding a contract obtained by bribery).
For a detailed explanation of World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, see
Pauwelyn, 259–60, supra note 46.
51 See Pauwelyn, 258–59, supra note 46 (explaining “fair and equitable
treatment” provisions and stating that “[s]o far . . . no case of corruption has been
found to constitute a breach of a BIT”).
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expanded mandate for arbitrators to accept submissions from amici
curiae that provide evidence of corruption.52
However, even with this reform, arbitrators could not influence
state governance structures directly.
They would simply
invalidate contracts on the basis of evidence that corruption tainted
the original deal. Carrington’s ultimate goal is to increase the cost
of paying and receiving bribes. Even if a country’s criminal justice
system is weak or corrupted, an arbitral decision that invalidates a
contract, or awards damages to a successor government, ought to
deter kickbacks up front. This deterrent will be most effective in a
multi-party democracy or in an autocracy whose leader is aging or
losing popular support.
Within existing domestic legal frameworks, corruption charges
have been incorporated into the resolution of private law disputes
in different ways.53 Litigants can sometimes use the legal system to
obtain compensation for their losses, helping to deter corruption in
the first place. In the United States they have used private rights of
action under U.S. securities and anti-trust laws, as well as fiduciary
duty class actions, to seek redress. Losing competitors have also
claimed unfair competition or tort damages from firms convicted
of overseas bribery in the United States and the European Union
(EU).54 These cases may be a growth area for anti-corruption
52 See Paul D. Carrington, Enforcing International Corrupt Practices Law, 32
MICH. J. INT’L L. 129, 154–64 (2010) (describing how “moderately successful efforts
in the United States since 1862 to reward private citizens serving as enforcers of
laws prohibiting corrupt practices” could be adapted by international
organizations to improve enforcement of “new public international laws”); Paul
D. Carrington, Law and Transnational Corruption: The Need for Lincoln’s Law Abroad,
70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 137–38 (2007) (concluding that the weakness of
the current system justifies the creation of an international forum for resolving
such disputes). See also, Paul Carrington, Private Enforcement of International Law,
in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 285, supra note 1 (stating that the “need clearly exists”
for the World Bank to “create a legal forum on the ICSID model that could enable
and reward effective private enforcement of international anti-corruption law”).
53 See generally Meyer, supra note 46 (discussing the rise of the international
anti-corruption industry and the relationship between national and international
standards in corruption cases).
54 In the United States, see Boyd v. AWB Ltd., 544 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (illustrating a failed antitrust claim, in which the plaintiff alleged defendants
bribed the United States government to maintain a monopoly in the Iraqi wheat
market). In the EU, see Case T-145/98, ADT v. Comm’n, 2000 E.C.R. II-391
(discussing applicants’ claim that there was an “infringement of the rules
governing tendering procedures and of the principle of fair competition”). In
South Africa, see Transnet Ltd. v. Sechaba Photoscan (Pty) Ltd. 2004 (1) SA 299 (SCA)
(noting that the award of purchase contract to the competitor of the respondent
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efforts if domestic courts in industrialized countries prove ready to
accept jurisdiction.55
As Johann Graf Lambsdorff suggests, simply voiding the entire
deal may be very costly for the ordinary citizens who benefit from
the contract.56 Transaction-specific investments already in place
can become worthless. Furthermore, the sanction of invalidity is
not tailored to the amount of harm; repeating the tender is costly
and time consuming, and the firm may have little incentive to
police its own employees. This reality leads Lambsdorff to argue
that contracts generally should be enforced but that the firm
should pay damages of thirty times the bribe to wipe out its illicit
gains.57 However, he recognizes that sometimes the entire deal is
so tainted that it should be entirely void. It may truly be a “white
elephant” that is draining state resources. In such cases, the
contract should not be retendered; the project simply should be
abandoned and damages levied. Lambsdorff would also give the

was the result of a “fraudulent tender process”). I am grateful to Abiola Makinwa
for supplying these citations.
55 Governments have also sometimes turned to ordinary courts for redress.
See, e.g., Republic of Nigeria v. Santolina Inv. Corp., [2007] EWHC 3053 (QB)
(U.K.) (holding that assets of a former Nigerian official held in British banks and
real estate were bribes and should be transferred to Government of Nigeria). The
background of the case is discussed in GLOBAL WITNESS, INTERNATIONAL THIEF
THIEF: HOW BRITISH BANKS ARE COMPLICIT IN NIGERIAN CORRUPTION (2010), available
at http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/international_thief_
thief_final.pdf. See also an effort in U.S. court by a state-owned Costa Rican
company to block Alcatel-Lucent’s FCPA settlement. It sought restitution from
the firm under a federal victim’s rights law. See Richard L. Cassin, Costs Rica
‘Victim’ Objects to Alcatel-Lucent Settlement, FCPA BLOG (May 5, 2011, 7:02 AM)
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/5/5/costa-rican-victim-objects-to-alcatellucent-settlement.html. After losses in the lower courts, the Costa Rican telephone
company filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court in
December 2012. See Thomas Fox, ICE Appeals Victims’ Rights Case to Supreme
Court, FCPA BLOG (Dec. 3, 2012, 11:23 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/
2012/12/3/ice-appeals-victim-rights-case-to-supreme-court.html.
The Alcatel
case is discussed in Abiola Makinwa, Defining a Private Law Approach to Fighting
Corruption, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 267, 278 n. 36, supra note 1.
56 See Lambsdorff, supra note 19, at 224 (“Maintaining the validity of contracts
and imposing fines on bribe-paying companies would reconcile anti-corruption
with the preservation of investor confidence.”). See also Mathias Nell, Contracts
Obtained by Means of Bribery: Should They Be Void or Valid?, 27 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 159
(2008) (explaining that nullifying corrupt contracts is counterproductive because it
does not promote voluntary disclosure).
57 To act as a deterrent, these payments would need to be a multiple of actual
damages because those who pay bribes are often not caught.
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host state the option to terminate future performance of the
contract even if it is enforced with respect to completed actions.58
I agree that a project with social value should be completed,
but it does not follow that the original firm should do the work. If
it does not have special contract-specific expertise and can’t
sabotage completion by a rival, the state should auction off the
right to complete the contract. More generally, there is a tradeoff
between penalizing the corrupt firm and assuring the smooth
completion of the project. The underlying problem is that once a
firm has been accused of corruption, it may simply seek to
sabotage, loot, and undermine the project instead of instituting
good internal monitoring systems. The corrupt firm may be able to
hold the state agency hostage and prevent effective enforcement.
Lambsdorff’s proposals, however one evaluates them,
highlight Pieth’s claim that the international arbitral system ought
to go beyond the claims of the parties to consider the broader social
implications of disputes. The goal should be to deter corruption in
the future, not just resolve the individual case in a satisfactory way.
However, as the experience of the International Criminal Court
illustrates, as soon as international bodies take up criminal
offenses, they are no longer neutral arbiters of disputes. The
judges may be neutral, but the prosecutors will argue for
conviction. Public officials and firms accused of crimes will begin
to push back, and questions will arise about the role of prosecutors
with an anti-corruption mandate. Yet, if the dispute remains a
purely civil one, and if the contract remains in place, an
opportunity for exerting leverage against corrupt firms and
officials will be lost. Reformers should seriously consider new
ways of combining international dispute resolution with domestic
criminal law enforcement.59
58 This is the second option presented by Meyer, supra note 46. Kevin Davis
also argues for enforcing the contract going forward so long as it remains a
valuable deal for the host country. See Kevin E. Davis, Civil Remedies for
Corruption in Government Contracting: Zero Tolerance Versus Proportional Liability
(Inst. for Int’l Law & Justice, Working Paper 2009/4, 2009), available at http://lsr.
nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1184&context=nyu_lewp (arguing that
remedies can be structured to create incentives for the generation of information
that can facilitate the imposition of other sanctions).
59 See Dugard, supra note 1 at 160–62 (critiquing the argument that corruption
is actually a crime against humanity and therefore should be handled by the
International Criminal Court). See also Abiola O. Makinwa, A Transaction Approach
to Fighting International Corruption, in GOVERNING SECURITY UNDER THE RULE OF
LAW? 175, 175 (J. Blad et al. eds., 2010) (advocating a “transaction approach”
which attempts to “recognize the role of the state while at the same time
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3.3. Anti-Corruption Projects and Programs [Cases E & F]
The most intrusive forms of international intervention are aid
and lending programs that seek directly to limit corruption or to
assure that it doesn’t undermine program goals (cases E and F). In
both cases, funders from IFIs, bi-lateral donors, and private
foundations intervene to support government reform and to limit
waste and corruption. They do this directly by supporting specific
programs and indirectly, through “policy based” lending that
provides budgetary support conditional on domestic government
safeguards or “good governance” policies. Nonprofits and the
media play a subsidiary role in keeping anti-corruption on the
agenda of IFIs and in helping in the design and monitoring of
programs.
International actors cannot legitimately force domestic
governments to become honest and corruption-free. They must
induce governmental cooperation—sometimes by supporting
projects that benefit the elite even though other priorities would
better serve ordinary people.60 The pressure to approve projects
can undermine efforts to hold governments to account. The Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness includes a pillar labeled
“ownership.”
This principle includes strategies to improve
institutions and tackle corruption.61 However, it may also induce
donors to defer to local demands even when they suspect
corruption and self-dealing. Aid agencies typically impose audit
requirements as a condition for aid, but they could make stronger
efforts. The claim that better auditing works to reduce corruption
seems borne out by EU aid programs in Africa. The EU uses its
own auditors. Observers in Africa believe that projects co-funded
by the EU are less corrupt than others.62 In projects with weak
financial controls, cost-overruns can simply lead the recipient

recognizing . . . the role of non-state auspices as well as non-state providers of
governance” in fighting international corruption); Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Law
and Economics of Bribery and Extortion, 6 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 217 (2010)
(discussing the law and economics of bribery and extortion in criminal law).
60 See GLOBAL WITNESS, http://www.globalwitness.org (last visited May 6,
2013) (chronicling instances of corruption in resource-rich nations).
61 See Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, OECD, http://www.
oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html (last
visited May 6, 2013).
62 See Søreide, Tostensen, & Skage, supra note 25, at 26 (mentioning EU
auditing standards).
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country to ask for and obtain more funds.63 The tension between
projects that benefit ordinary people and those that benefit elites
makes the concept of “ownership” problematic.
Civil society groups can sometimes promote anti-corruption
projects without central government approval—usually through
monitoring activities, information gathering, or pilot projects.
Sometimes IFIs and NGOs can work at the grassroots with local
governments. They may find local allies able to support reform
without generating a backlash from the central government. The
goal is to finance development projects that benefit the population
without triggering rent-seeking.
These anti-corruption initiatives predictably generate tension
and backlash. Sometimes the very existence of aid funds fuels
corruption in poor countries, because there are few other resources
available. There is a risk, as Wren-Lewis points out, that aid
dependence makes government reform harder, not easier.64 Civil
servants may be enlisted to further the anti-corruption agenda by
aid funds that supplement their salaries, provide per diems for
travel and conference attendance, and supply incentive payments
for effective performance. Such programs risk a backlash if they
are terminated after a few years. Local institutions cannot develop
sustainable anti-corruption strategies if they are overly dependent
on foreign financial and technical assistance.
3.3.1. Economic Development and Anti-Corruption Policies
Some reforms favored by IFIs on general development
principles are also touted as anti-corruption strategies. These
reforms include fair bidding procedures for government
procurement, improved financial auditing, transparent public
decision-making
processes,
streamlined
and
simplified
bureaucratic procedures, civil service reform, easy access to
information, and prompt and easy-to-use appeals processes (case
E). Such reforms can both limit corrupt incentives and reduce
other forms of waste and inefficiency.
They may be less
63 See
SPECIAL INSPECTORS GENERAL FOR IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN,
http://www.SIGIR.mil (last visited May 6, 2013) (providing numerous examples
drawn from the rebuilding experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.). For an
overview of corruption in Afghanistan, see UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND
CRIME, CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN: RECENT PATTERNS AND TRENDS (2012),
available
at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Corruption_in_
Afghanistan_FINAL.pdf.
64 Wren-Lewis, supra note 12 at 96.
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threatening to national leaders and more difficult for them to
oppose if the benefits are improved service delivery and more
effective implementation of tax and regulatory laws.
Of course, procedures that increase transparency and invite
public participation can lead to delay and invite controversy—so
there may be tradeoffs between more government accountability
and speed. But quick action isn’t a virtue if it means that public
officials can easily satisfy their own aims without concern for
public or expert opinion.
3.3.2. Promoting Government Legitimacy
International institutions are likely to have a more limited
impact when they try to promote government legitimacy (case F).
A corrupt elite can simply condemn them as outside meddlers
seeking to undermine state sovereignty. Nevertheless, there are a
few points of entry.
I have already pointed to the utility of information-generating
strategies. Going beyond the mere provision of information, IFIs
could condition their loans and grants on the host country’s
adoption of mechanisms shown to work elsewhere.
These
requirements must be real reforms, not just shams set up for
international consumption.65 Furthermore, such conditionality will
not be credible unless donors control corruption in their own
projects and send a signal to suppliers and contractors that
corruption will not be tolerated.66
If payoffs and favoritism are deeply embedded in local
practices, IFIs’ programs that mandate bureaucratic and
programmatic reforms may be hard-pressed to show results. Local
officials must buy into the reforms, or they will fail. Donors’
monitoring ought to build on baseline data on service delivery (or
tax and customs receipts, environmental quality, etc.) so their staff
can return after a time to see if the anti-corruption program had
any impact. This data need not always include actual measures of
payoff levels. Household and business surveys can get at
individual experiences, especially when corruption is endemic, but
there may also be other objective measures such as gaps between
program goals and actual performance, levels of tax and tariff
65 See Recanatini, supra note 26 (stressing this problem in her analysis of anticorruption agencies).
66 See Dubois & Nowlan, supra note 6, at 16–17 (arguing that the Global
Administrative Law approach will help donors hold institutions accountable).
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collections, and road quality. Failures are just as important as
successes and need to be part of an ongoing process of learning.
Unfortunately, some countries may simply not be worth the
time, funding, and trouble that it takes to provide help beyond the
provision of information. Geopolitical concerns may push the IFIs
to continue to work in such countries, but those individuals at the
staff level should argue that development goals are poorly served
by continued funding of projects riddled with corruption. In the
worst case, aid fuels corruption by setting off an illicit competition
for funds.67 Funds should be redirected to countries and projects
that can credibly reduce poverty and aid growth and to projects
that explicitly address governance challenges where points of
leverage exist.
3.3.3. Post-conflict Countries
Post-conflict countries are a special case. After the conflict
ends, they often promptly receive massive aid flows for rebuilding
but suffer from weak institutions that create opportunities for
corruption. If care is not taken, corruption can substitute for
institutional development and become entrenched in the
embryonic regime. Of course, in some cases, former combatants, at
both the high and low levels, may need to be bought off with onetime cash and in-kind benefits.68 These transfers may be a
condition for obtaining peace, but they need to be structured as
lump-sum benefits that do not permanently distort the operation of
the economy or the government. Don’t give the rebel army turned
political party a fifty percent ownership stake in the national oil
company or promise warring ethnic groups a fixed share of the
public pie.69 The aim should be to buy off such groups with lumpsum payments, not give them an ongoing incentive to stay together
and divide the country. Furthermore, do not give the regular
67 See June & Heller, supra note 17 (stressing how corruption can be
exacerbated by the potential for competition for funds).
68 For example, in Mozambique, the United Nations provided generous
funding to former rebels on the condition that they establish a political party and
run candidates in elections. Although much of the funding supported party
development, many observers noted that funds also were used to provide direct
financial benefits to former rebel leaders. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17, at
76–80 (providing further details and sources for this case).
69 Such a division of benefits occurred in the post-conflict constitution in
Burundi. For a critical view of the result, see Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17, at 80–
82.
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military a stake in non-defense government programs and monitor
its involvement in defense contracts, or it may use its coercive
power to extort payoffs.
International nonprofits such as TI, Global Witness, and Global
Integrity, can be helpful here in monitoring the situation on the
ground, but outside monitoring is not sufficient. The donors’ own
internal auditing and oversight bodies also need sufficient funding
and support. If international funders put speed ahead of integrity,
they may be institutionalizing structural corruption problems in
just those cases where aid might otherwise have had the biggest
positive impact.70
3.3.4. Emerging Economies
Finally, Brazil, Russia, China, and India and other emerging
economies will play an increasing role at the World Bank and at
other IFIs that are developing anti-corruption initiatives. Even
when they cannot influence the IFIs overall policy, they can shape
individual decisions through their own interactions with these
institutions. For example, IFIs are in no position to impose a
comprehensive anti-corruption program on China even though
corruption remains high there and may be increasing.71
Nevertheless, top leadership expresses great concern about the
problem and may be willing to learn from experiences elsewhere.
4.

“LEGAL” CORRUPTION: PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC POWER

This essay concentrates on corruption that violates legal rules.
Both the payment and the receipt of bribes and kickbacks are
crimes in most countries—as are extortion threats and the
embezzlement of public funds. But private wealth influences
public choices in many legal ways, such as campaign contributions,
lobbying expenses, financial conflicts of interests, consultancy
payments to the politically connected, and public relations
campaigns designed to influence public opinion on particular

70 See June & Heller, supra note 17, at 20–21 (describing an impasse
developing between rival political alliances following troop withdrawal from
Lebanon); see generally Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17.
71 On the continuing high levels of corruption in China, see generally Fu
Hualing, The Upward and Downward Spirals in China’s Anti-Corruption Enforcement,
in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CHINA 390 (Mike McConville
& Eva Pils eds., 2013).
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issues.72 A crackdown on illegal payoffs may lead to a shift toward
legal campaign contributions or lobbying. Conversely, overly
stringent limits on legal gifts are likely to push campaign
contributions underground and into outright corrupt payoffs.
Politicians who are overly dependent on wealthy interests may
face defeat at the polls, but only if citizens know and care about the
sources of candidates’ funds. This suggests that crackdowns on
political corruption should be complemented by increased
transparency for campaign funding or by a move toward public
financing.73 Limiting the role of money in politics requires a
holistic approach that covers legal as well as illegal funds.
In democracies the tension between private wealth and
majoritarian values is as fundamental as that between organized
groups and the general public, and each may feed off the other.
Small groups of wealthy firms and individuals are likely to be able
to organize more easily than broad publics. If concentrated, wellfunded groups attempt to influence public opinion in their favor,
and if they face few countervailing efforts, policies may obtain
majority support even though the main beneficiaries are the
wealthy elite.
In authoritarian systems, there may be no overt tension because
public and private elites are deeply interconnected. Arms-length
bribery and kickbacks are not necessary because top officials and
the business elite are part of the same group that controls both the
political and the economic systems. Multi-national firms seeking
business advantage cultivate ties with this elite and become part of
the system. In the extreme, the notion of “conflict-of-interest” is
meaningless. There is simply no public interest with a voice in the
operation of the state.

72 The issues discussed here were emphasized by Daniel Kaufmann and Tina
Søreide in the discussions at the Anti-Corruption Policy workshop. See also
Pauwelyn, supra note 46 (noting that failures at the sector level can be traced to
political corruption); Søreide, supra note 2 (noting the influence of the private
sector); Daniel Kaufmann & Pedro C. Vicente, Legal Corruption, 23 ECON. & POL.
195 (2011) (analyzing the private sector’s influence gained through corruption);
Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption and the Global Financial Crisis, FORBES (Jan. 27, 2009),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/27/corruption-financial-crisis-business-corrup
tion09_0127corruption.html (arguing that systematic corruption contributed
significantly to the financial crisis).
73 For one recommendation for public financing, see generally BRUCE
ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS (2004) (recommending a publicly
funded voucher system and a secret donation booth for private donations).
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In general, whatever the form of government, there are
tensions between the interests of even honest multi-nationals and
the general public in host countries. Multi-nationals seek profits
and are not directly concerned with benefits to host nations’
citizens unless they show up in the bottom line. International
actors who engage with MNCs should go beyond a narrow anticorruption agenda. In addition to urging MNCs support for
curtailing corruption, these advocates should encourage corporate
social responsibility policies that include a broader concern with
host nation welfare. Anti-corruption policy is not just about
directly limiting bribes.
Efforts to benefit ordinary people, improve the competitiveness
of the economy, and enhance government accountability may all
be stymied by the link between private wealth and public power.
Worse yet, private wealth has a threat advantage. Both local elites
and multinational firms can invest outside the country if their
privileged position is threatened. This threat advantage points to
another role for the international community. It can help to
smooth transitions to a more competitive market and a more
accountable government, whether or not illegal payoffs are a major
factor. Although outright corruption in the form of bribes and
kickbacks will remain a problem facing all polities for the
foreseeable future, those interested in promoting economic growth,
poverty alleviation, governance reform, and market efficiency also
need to consider how the legal exercise of financial power
undermines these values.
5.

CONCLUSIONS

My basic message is that international efforts to reduce
corruption ought to be linked to the ultimate goals of economic
development,
government
legitimacy,
and
international
competitiveness.
Reductions in corruption are not ends in
themselves but are part of the global focus on improving human
well-being and government functioning. In the past, reform of the
state and the economy proceeded with little acknowledgment of
the risks of corruption and self-dealing. Some even argued for
corruption’s functionality. Now that the pathologies of bribery are
well known, there is a risk of overreacting. The temptation is
simply to concentrate on creating clean government and honest aid
projects without asking how economic and political power actually
is distributed. Conversely, initiatives that stress local “ownership,”
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such as the Paris Declaration, risk downplaying the accountability
of governments both to donors and to their own citizens.
Although the Paris Declaration is full of language stressing results
and accountability, it is not clear how to achieve “ownership” of
these goals if the leadership is corrupt. This suggests that the three
roles for international actors—information provider, international
facilitator, and domestic project sponsor—should be rethought.
Under some conditions, neither domestic governments nor
donor representatives see benefits from documenting corruption
and from taking concrete steps to reduce its impact. Both domestic
and foreign investors may share this reluctance. Here is where
independent groups and the media need to concentrate attention.
These watchdogs are unlikely to be funded well enough to carry
out valid social science research on a large scale, but they can prod
donors and governments to take corruption seriously enough to
study it themselves.
We need to learn more about how corruption operates in
practice, both at the grassroots and at high levels. Micro-analytic
research should document successes and failures on the ground
that go beyond reporting inputs, such as attendance at integrity
workshops. Corruption is a complex phenomenon that is difficult
to measure, but in recent years researchers have developed a
number of clever strategies to measure corruption or its impact,
both directly and indirectly. Hence, one relatively straightforward
recommendation is to forge stronger links between aid projects and
information provision so that governments can learn from others’
experiences.
At the top of the state, both cross-country
benchmarking research and investigative reporting by journalists
and civil society groups should be encouraged along with
programs that train local investigative journalists and help to
protect those facing harassment or worse.
The system of international dispute resolution should consider
corruption and self-dealing.
Arbitrators are beginning to
acknowledge that their decisions reach beyond the parties and
have an impact on the citizens of host countries—as well as on the
integrity of the international trade and investment regime as a
whole. Perhaps a new international institution is needed to
highlight these concerns or perhaps the arbitral regime can open
up, but the current situation is clearly unacceptable given the costs
of high-level corruption.
Criminal prosecutions are likely to remain the province of
domestic courts for the foreseeable future, but international bodies

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013

01_ROSE-ACKERMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

488

8/6/2013 7:54 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 34:3

can do more to help develop criminal cases and to support reform
of criminal justice systems so that they are independent of politics
and operate fairly and honestly. A major risk of relying heavily on
the criminal law, however, is that it can easily be abused to
discredit political opponents. Thus, international institutions
should tread cautiously in promoting criminal law approaches.
Anti-corruption initiatives need to take a more holistic
approach. A country’s development agencies should talk to
counterparts that promote business, and financial regulators must
talk to the police.74 This recommendation at the country level
applies internationally as well.
There may be too much
specialization of function, permitting corruption to flourish in the
grey zones where no agency can act, or worse, where no one has an
interest in acting. Fighting corruption is too complex a task to
reduce to a simple checklist for international actors. My taxonomy,
however, aims to help different actors to see how their own
priorities overlap or conflict with others who are also trying to
fight corruption throughout the world.

74 This argument is made by Global Witness. See Global Witness, A Joined-Up
Approach to Tackling Natural Resource-Related Corruption, and How There Isn’t One!,
in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 113, supra note 1 (describing how a “joined-up”
approach is required to tackle natural resource corruption).
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APPENDIX
Attendees; Anti-Corruption Policy: Can International Actors Play a
Constructive Role? (Affiliation at time of Bellagio workshop, June
2011)
Patrick Alley—Global Witness
Paul Carrington—Duke University Law School
Kevin Davis—New York University Law School
Roberto de Michele—Inter-American Development Bank
Pascale Hélène Dubois—World Bank
John Dugard—University of Pretoria
Fu Hauling—University of Hong Kong
Nathaniel Heller—Global Integrity
Robin Hodess—Transparency International
Daniel Kaufmann—The Brookings Institution
Jana Kunicová—World Bank
Johann Graf Lambsdorff—University of Passau
Abiola Makinwa—Erasmus University (Rotterdam)
Olaf Meyer—University of Bremen
Joost Pauwelyn—Graduate Institute of Int’l Studies (Geneva)
Mark Pieth—University of Basel Law School
Francesca Recanatini—World Bank
Susan Rose-Ackerman—Yale University
Tina Søreide—Chr. Michelson Institute (Bergen)
Jose Ugaz—Benites, Forno, Ugaz & Ludowieg, Andrade (Lima)
Liam Wren-Lewis—Oxford University
Michela Wrong—journalist and author (London)
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